Formal fiscal rules have been introduced in many countries throughout the world. While most studies focus on the intra-jurisdictional effects of fiscal rules, vertical effects on the finances of other levels of government have yet to be explored thoroughly. This paper investigates the influence of Swiss cantonal debt brakes on municipal finances during the years 1980-2011 by examining aggregated and disaggregated local data. A Difference-in-Differences estimation (twoway fixed effects) provides little evidence that budget constraints at the cantonal level affect average municipal finances and fiscal decentralization.
INTRODUCTION
National and sub-national fiscal rules have been widely implemented in the hope that they would reduce incentives to overspend and thus ensure sustainability of public finances.
However, politicians are tempted to circumvent these constraints in order to regain fiscal discretion. Those unintended consequences of fiscal rules have been primarily discussed with respect to window-dressing and creative accounting. Among other things, the accumulation of tax arrears, the reclassification of expenditures, off-budget activities and the use of nonrestricted debt instruments may help to disguise public deficits. Consequently, political decision-makers follow the rule only superficially as all they do is temporarily embellish the targeted headline indicators and hardly improve the overall fiscal position.
In addition to such intra-jurisdictional effects, there are good reasons to assume that fiscal rules also have vertical effects in federations with multiple government layers. Fiscal rules on an upper government level may influence lower government finances even though the latter are not formally covered by the constraints. Unlike accounting gimmicks, vertical effects of fiscal rules might change recurring costs on the upper and lower government levels and affect the extent of fiscal decentralization. From a theoretical standpoint, there could be vertical effects in both directions, such as the improvement or the burdening of finances at a lower level of government. Thus, whether and how fiscal rules constraining fiscal deficit at an upper level of government affect finances at a lower level of governments is a question to be answered empirically.
Although little research exists on the vertical effects of fiscal rules, German municipalities complained that the new budget constraints at the state level (Laender) would burden their finances (German Association of Cities, 2011; Lenk et al., 2012) . 1 Swiss municipalities expressed similar concerns, notably claiming that the canton of Zurich would consolidate its budget on their back and shift the fiscal burden to the local level (NZZ, 2004; Steiner et al., 2012) .
Against this background, this paper analyzes the influence of cantonal debt brakes on local finances in Switzerland. To reveal vertical effects, we examine a sample of all municipalities aggregated at the cantonal level and a sample of disaggregated data of the 139 largest cities .
2 A Difference-in-Differences estimation (two-way fixed effects)
provides little evidence that budget constraints at the cantonal level affect average local finances or decentralization. This holds even in situations that make vertical effects most likely,
i.e., in times of fiscal shocks at the cantonal level.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews empirical studies. Section 3 presents the Swiss institutional framework alongside with the discussion of vertical transmission channels and ends with testable hypotheses. The data and empirical strategy are presented in Section 4. The baseline results are reported in Section 5 and the robustness checks in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 discusses implications of the main findings and offers concluding remarks.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The first empirical studies on the effects of sub-national fiscal rules on budget outcomes have presumably been conducted in the late 1960s for the US (Mitchell, 1967; Pogue, 1970) . More recent studies provide evidence that strong budget limitations support fiscal discipline among US states (for a survey see Burret and Feld, 2014) . Similar evidence exists for other countries, such as Canada (Imbeau and Tellier, 2004) , Latin America (Alesina et al., 1999) , Africa (Gollwitzer, 2010) , OECD countries (Guichard et al., 2007) , EU countries (Ayuso-i-Casals et al., 2007; De Haan et al., 1999; Debrun et al., 2008; Foremny, 2014; Hallerberg et al., 2007; Marneffe et al., 2011) and various other states (Blume and Voigt, 2013; Lavigne, 2011; Singh and Plekhanov, 2006) . Interestingly, Reuter (2015) shows that, even though they are often violated, fiscal rules are effective as they act as a kind of benchmark for good fiscal policy in EU countries.
3
Empirical studies on Switzerland consistently find that cantonal deficit restrictions, i.e., debt brakes, trigger sound cantonal finances. In an initial study on cantonal debt brakes, Feld and Kirchgässner (2001a) construct a fiscal rule index that ranges from 0 to 3 for the period 1986-1997. Their results suggest that strong debt brakes significantly depress cantonal debt and deficits. Schaltegger (2002) draws a similar conclusion for the years 1980 -1998 provide further evidence for the same period. Krogstrup and Wälti (2008) confirm the previous findings after controlling for voter preferences. A new fiscal rule index that assigns values between 0 and 100 is constructed by Yerly (2013) . Again, in line with previous results, she finds that harder budget rules reduce cantonal deficits. Finally, exploit a rich dataset and show that cantonal debt brakes have the most pronounced impact on the current budget (rather than the total budget) and mitigate political budget cycles.
A somewhat different question is analyzed by Luechinger and Schaltegger (2013) . They find evidence that debt brakes significantly reduce the probability of projected and realized cantonal deficits. While Chatagny (2015) shows that revenue projection errors are significantly related to the ideology of the cantonal finance minister, debt brakes tend to reduce the impact of ideology. In a related strand of literature, Feld et al. (2013) provide evidence that cantonal yield spreads are significantly decreased by strong debt brakes and by the no-bailout regime established subsequent to the Leukerbad Supreme Court decision in 2003. Similar findings are obtained for fiscal rules in the EU (Iara and Wolff, 2014) . Interestingly, a recent study on
Swedish municipalities suggests that bailouts may favor fiscal discipline if the granted payments are conditional on measures that improve the situation (Dietrichson and Ellegård, 2015) .
However, the overall effect of budget rules on fiscal outcomes might be lower than indicated by the targeted headline variables if the constraints are avoided by means of fiscal gimmickry. 4 Empirical analyses focus either on US states (Bennett and DiLorenzo, 1983; Briffault, 1996; Bunch, 1991; Costello et al., 2012; GAO, 1993; Mitchell, 1967; von Hagen, 1992 von Hagen, , 1991 or EU member countries (Balduzzi and Grembi, 2011; Bernoth and Wolff, 2008; Buti et al., 2007; Dafflon and Rossi, 1999; Koen and van den Noord, 2005; Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama, 2006;  von Hagen and Wolff, 2006) . More recently, showed that Swiss cantonal debt brakes can hardly be associated with a shift of expenditures from the (constrained) current budget to the (unconstrained) investment budget.
While a few studies mention the possibility of vertical effects of fiscal rules (Briffault, 1996; Heins, 1963; Mitchell, 1967; New, 2001; Sørensen et al., 2001 ), empirical evidence is scarce. Stansel (1994) provides anecdotal evidence that tax and expenditure limitations in US states lead to a shift of costs to local governments. To the best of our knowledge, so far only five empirical studies touch upon the issue of vertical effects of fiscal rules (Table 1) . Nice (1991) shows that fiscal rules in US states are, if anything, associated with decreased debt at the local level. Unlike Nice (1991 ), von Hagen (1992 finds that the ratio between municipal and state debt tends to be larger in states with fiscal rules. Similarly, Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996) conclude that restrictive provisions at the state level lead to more debt issuance at the local level. and provide some evidence for Switzerland. The two studies examine the effect of cantonal debt brakes on cantonal deficits and combined cantonal and local deficits. As the estimated debt brake coefficient is highly significant and of almost equal size in both equations, the studies consistently conclude that debt brakes have little impact on local deficits. If anything, evidence suggests that cantonal debt brakes can be associated with decreased local deficits. A related strand of literature discusses the vertical effects of direct democracy. Matsusaka's findings (1995) suggest that local spending is higher in US states with popular initiatives. While show that centralization of expenditure is less likely in Swiss cantons with direct democracy, Funk and Gathmann (2011) find only little evidence for an impact of cantonal direct democracy on local spending and decentralization. Finally, Galletta and Jametti (2015) find that cantonal fiscal referenda increase local spending particularly in municipalities without fiscal referenda. In a companion paper, Galletta (2015) shows that decentralization decreases once mandatory referenda are introduced at the local level. Another related field of research focuses on vertical tax externalities. Several studies provide evidence in favor of a significant relation between national and sub-national tax rates (see Brülhart and Jametti, 2006 , and for a survey on the effects of decentralization Baskaran, 2011 , and more recently Ligthart and van Oudheusden, 2015) .
In sum, the few existing studies on vertical effects of fiscal rules either only elude to the issue, are inconclusive, use combined data of the regional and local levels, or analyze meagre datasets. The only existing papers on vertical effects of fiscal rules in Switzerland 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND VERTICAL TRANSMISSION CHANNELS
The federal framework of Switzerland is characterized by a strong tradition of fiscal autonomy and fiscal responsibility of the federal level as well as of the 26 cantons (states) and the 2,353 municipalities. Despite amalgamations, half of all municipalities still count less than 1,000
residents. While the structure of the local level is subject to cantonal provisions, municipalities de facto constitute the third level of government and enjoy substantial autonomy ever since (Meyer, 2011) . 5 In order to coordinate the provision of public services, the cantons frequently award/withdraw mandates to/from their municipalities. For instance in 2004, the fiscal restructuring program of the canton of Zurich mandated the duty to contribute a basic amount to the funding of inpatient treatment to the local level. Since 2012, the canton assumes full hospital funding, while the funding of home care and nursing home is fully dependent on municipalities (VZF, 2011) . Besides their executive functions related to the implementation and administration of cantonal mandates, the municipalities carry out legislative and judicial tasks.
The environment and culture and recreation are by far the most important areas of local responsibility as measured by their spending share (Table 2) . While annual local spending accounts for almost one quarter of total public spending, Switzerland has the lowest share of municipal funding through transfers (around 13%) across the whole of Europe (Council of Europe, 1997: 25; Rühli, 2013) . The communities can set surcharges on income taxes relatively autonomously, but tax rates and bases are defined at the cantonal level (Feld et al., 2011) . The variation of local tax burdens is mitigated by complex cantonal schemes of fiscal equalization among communities. Besides the fiscal autonomy of tax and expenditure, municipalities have the right to borrow and issue debt. Kirchgässner ( , 2001a and Feld et al. (2013) exploit this large variation in cantonal fiscal regulations in order to construct a fiscal rule index. They assign an index value between zero and three according to the number of requirements the fiscal rule fulfils. The evaluated components are: (I) the strong link between budget planning and execution, (II) the numeric deficit limit and (III) automatic sanctions. Despite the prevalence of fiscal rules today, we still assign an index value of zero to nine cantons, as their constraints do not meet any of the three criteria. Remarkably, all three requirements are only satisfied by the relatively old debt brakes of St. Gall (1929 , revised 1997 ) and Fribourg (1960 , revised 1996 and since 2008 Basel-County.
While debt brakes have also been in place for some time in Solothurn (1986 Solothurn ( , revised 2005 , Grisons (1988) and Appenzell Outer Rhodes (1996) , most other cantons only followed after the turn of the millennium (Figure 1 ). Thereby the fiscal burden of local governments would be reduced. As Figure 2 indicates, vertical effects could basically work in opposite directions. However, we cast doubt on the possibility of a notable transmission of debt brakes through channels (1), (2) and (4), since such a transmission is likely to be accompanied by decreased or at least nonincreasing cantonal spending. However, report evidence that debt brakes increase cantonal spending (by less than revenues). Moreover, a notable transmission through channel (2) is additionally questionable as cantons transfer only minor amounts to their municipalities.
Thus, a transmission through channels (3) and (5), i.e., debt brakes induce cantons to work towards a consolidation of local finances or increase citizens' willingness to delegate responsibilities to the canton (rather than to the local level), seems to be more likely. Regardless of which of the two channels dominates, we expect the municipal response to imply lower municipal expenditures, deficits and debt. Against this background, we will test the following hypotheses: channel (4) channel (3) channel (5) channel (1), (2) To conclude, Switzerland provides an almost ideal institutional setting to examine the effects of fiscal rules on the finances of lower levels of government. First, despite institutional differences between Swiss cantons, the common political, cultural and constitutional framework implies less heterogeneity across municipalities than across countries making spurious correlation due to omitted variables less likely (Luechinger and Schaltegger, 2013) .
Second, time and canton fixed effects can be applied since debt brakes have been implemented at different points in time. Third, seven cantons have yet to introduce a (credible) debt brake, giving us a treatment and a control group. Fourth, empirical evidence suggests that debt brakes are strong enough to trigger fiscal consequences at the cantonal level. Fifth, cantonal debt brakes do not formally cover the local level. And sixth, the fiscal framework allows for vertical transmission channels.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
In order to test our hypotheses, we use two datasets. The first sample covers harmonized data Drawing on the literature (e.g., De Haan and Sturm, 1994; Kirchgässner, 2001a, 2001b; Sachs, 1989a, 1989b; Shadbegian, 1996) , we use institutional, economic, sociodemographic and political variables to explain local fiscal outcomes. 10 The main institutional variables measure the presence and stringency of cantonal fiscal rules. The local institutional setting, such as town meetings, municipal parliaments or mandatory fiscal referenda either does not vary sufficiently across time to be taken into account, or data is not continuously available. However, indicators of direct democracy at the cantonal level enter the robustness checks. While we could not gather information on budget rules on the local level during the period of interest, evidence suggests that local fiscal constraints do not have a significant impact on municipal finances (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2001a) .
To capture (macro-) economic conditions, we include the unemployment rate
11
, taxable income, indicators of inter-governmental grants (i.e., own revenues) and relative local income.
Socio-demographic indicators map the age structure of the population, cultural idiosyncrasies 10 Refer to this literature for a broader discussion of our control variables. 11 A direct influence of the level of unemployment on municipal finances is unlikely since unemployment insurance is financed by a federal payroll tax and benefits are regulated by state and cantonal authorities. However, the unemployment rate can be used as a proxy for welfare spending (partly) paid for by the local level of government.
Expenditure Revenue Debt
(approximated by the language) and the number of citizens. Political variables measure the ideology of the government and the number of parties in the municipal executive. Number of political parties in the municipal government and t indicates the year, i the municipality, j the municipalities within one canton and c the canton.
The models are estimated using OLS with canton (γ) and time (τ) fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity and unobserved time-specific factors affecting all entities. The twoway fixed effects estimator can be seen as a generalization of the Differences-in-Differences estimator as both techniques basically eliminate time trends affecting all units and timeconstant differences between the units. 12 A key assumption for such a research design is that the treatment group (municipalities in a canton that is constrained by a debt brake) and control group (municipalities in a canton that is not constrained by a debt brake) would follow a common trend in the absence of treatment. While this is obviously not observable for the treated, similar trends before the treatment can strengthen the validity of the Differences-inDifferences estimates. Figure A .1 illustrates the development of local finances in cantons prior to the introduction of a debt brake (treatment) and in the control groups. The graphs suggest that local finances followed rather similar trends in all groups. In addition, the common political, cultural and constitutional Swiss framework adds to the credibility of the common trend assumption.
The use of two-way fixed effects and the common framework in Switzerland make spurious correlation due to omitted variables less likely. Nevertheless, the effect of cantonal debt brakes might not be the same for all treated units across time. Treatment heterogeneity might be an issue as we examine a long time-period of up to 32 years. For instance, once a debt brake passes it enters a pre-existing (explicit and implicit) framework that could change over time such that even similarly designed rules may have a different impact if much time passes between their statutory introductions. Similarly, vertical effects might be observed particularly during times of fiscal stress at the cantonal level and be less pronounced when the economy is running smoothly. Moreover, the common trend assumption is hard to defend for long periods with the consideration of pre-treatment trends. Therefore the robustness analysis separately examines the effect of "early" and "late" debt brake adopters and studies the influence of fiscal stress at 12 The robustness analysis provides the results of models without fixed effects. Simplified, the Differences-inDifferences estimator can be written as: ß the cantonal level. Besides, the investigation of sub-periods helps to cope with structural brakes due to a major revision in accounting standards.
On the one hand, endogeneity of the cantonal debt brakes is less of an issue since the municipalities enjoy large autonomy. On the other hand, the rules reflect the voters' preference since they are commonly subject to referenda. Thus, it is questionable whether the estimated effect is causal on the debt brake or on voters' preferences. To clarify whether debt brakes induce structural breaks, we calculate standard Chow breakpoint tests. The test has the null hypothesis that parameters (slopes and the intercept) of municipalities located in cantons with a debt brake are not different from those of the other group. If the null hypothesis is rejected, cantonal debt brakes induce a break in the regression coefficients. In addition, we follow Poterba (1997 Poterba ( , 1996 and address potential endogeneity of fiscal institutions by controlling for voter preferences. Dafflon and Pujol (2001) suggest that the voters' fiscal preferences are largely time-invariant and are, thus, already captured by the fixed effects. Nevertheless, we adopt a frequent approach and use the share of left-wing parties in the municipal executive as an indicator of voter preferences in the second sample. The issue is further investigated in the robustness analysis. The endogeneity of our economic controls is less of an issue as they are unlikely to be influenced by the dependent variables within the same year.
Panel data frequently results in biased standard errors due to autocorrelation and crosssectional dependence of the error terms that arise from common shocks and unobserved components. In fact, the Pesaran (2004) pre-estimation test rejects error cross-section independence for almost all outcome variables at the 1% level (Table A.5) . 13 While clusterrobust standard errors are a common solution, a small number of clusters can lead to a substantial downward bias of estimated standard errors and, thus, an overstatement of statistical significance (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Cameron et al., 2008) . For accurate inference, the data should have at least 50 clusters of roughly equal sizes or at least 20 balanced clusters (Kézdi, 2004; Nichols and Schaffer, 2007) . Rogers (1993) suggests that a cluster should not contain more than five percent of the sample data. As the first (aggregated) dataset comprises 25 cantons and data is almost equally distributed among cantons, we adjust the errors for clustering on the cantonal level and correct for heteroscedasticity following Luechinger and Schaltegger (2013) who examined a similar dataset and concluded that clustering at the cantonal level does not imply a substantial bias with reference to simulations by Bertrand et al. (2004) and Cameron et al. (2008) .
Unlike the first sample, the second one comprises 139 municipalities that are considerably differently distributed among the 24 cantons. For instance, 24 communities are located in Zurich and 18 in Berne and only one municipality in Uri, Nidwalden, Glarus and both Appenzells.
Since the cantonal cluster sizes would be largely unbalanced in this case, the cure of clusterrobust standard errors could be worse than the disease (Nichols and Schaffer, 2007) . Thus, cluster-robust standard errors are only reported for the first sample. To further improve inference in both datasets we calculate robust standard errors based on the wild-cluster bootstrap-t procedure. The resampling method relaxes the restriction of equally sized clusters and has been found to work well in cases with few clusters (Cameron and Miller, 2013; Cameron et al., 2008) . 14 In addition, it is quite robust to differences in the number of units in the treatment and control groups (MacKinnon and Webb, 2015 The method uses the wild bootstrap to resample clusters of residuals obtained from regressions which impose the null hypothesis (ß = 0) and re-estimates the original equation with the newly generated residuals. The pseudo samples of clusters are formed by multiplying the residuals with 1 and -1 with a probability of 0.5. The so-called Rademacher weight provides asymptotic refinement. See Cameron et al. (2008) for details. We employ the Stata post-estimation command bootwildct provided by Malde (2012) with 1000 repetitions. 15 All estimates are performed with Stata 13. The discussion is primarily restricted to the main variables of interest. A reduced baseline model of each sample shows on the one hand that our controls matter and on the other hand, that statistical significance crucially depends on the standard errors under consideration (Tables A.6 and A.7).
hypothesis (1), neither the debt brake dummy nor the fiscal rule index is statistically significant in any equation (which is confirmed by the bootstrapped p-values, Table 3 in square brackets).
As for controls, population, unemployment and language differences turn out to be significant in at least some equations. The numbers in parentheses indicate the estimated t-statistics for standard errors adjusted for clustering at the cantonal level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. These values are used to determine statistical significance: *p<0.1 (significance at the 10% level), **p<0.05 (significance at the 5% level), and ***p<0.01 (significance at the 1% level). The numbers in square brackets indicate the estimated p-values for the fiscal rule variables using the wild-cluster bootstrap-t procedure. The Wald test has the null hypothesis that the fixed effects are jointly equal to zero. The Chow test has the null hypothesis that the parameters of municipalities located in cantons with a debt brake are equal to those of the other group. For Wald and Chow tests, we report test statistics based on regressions with cluster-robust standard errors.
The second sample, that covers large cities only and includes additional controls, largely confirms the previous sample's findings (Table 4 ). Like in sample one, we follow Wald test results and apply cantonal and year fixed effects. As suggested by the first sample, cantonal debt brakes reduce local spending, revenue and debt. Conversely, they have a positive impact on local deficits. The statistical significance of the estimated effects depends on the standard errors under consideration. The default standard errors indicate a statistically significant impact of debt brakes in all but the debt equation (Table 4 in braces). As discussed in Section 4, the default standard errors may, however, be erroneous. Thus, we base statistical inference in the second sample on p-values computed by the wild-cluster bootstrap-t procedure (Table 4 in square brackets). In compliance with the first sample's findings, the bootstrapped p-values reveal that neither the debt brake nor the fiscal rule index reaches statistical significance in any equation. .50*** 3.80*** Note: Canton and year fixed effects are included. Constant not shown. The numbers in square brackets indicate the estimated p-values using the wild-cluster bootstrap-t procedure. These values are used to determine statistical significance: *p<0.1 (significance at the 10% level), **p<0.05 (significance at the 5% level), and ***p<0.01 (significance at the 1% level). Number in braces indicate estimated t-statistics for default standard errors. The Wald test has the null hypothesis that the fixed effects are jointly equal to zero. The Chow test has the null hypothesis that the parameters of municipalities located in cantons with a debt brake are equal to those of the other group. For Wald and Chow tests, we report test statistics based on regressions default standard errors.
Once we base statistical inference on the bootstrapped p-values only few controls are statistically significant. Like in the first sample, statistical significance obtains with respect to socio-demographic variables. In addition, own revenues are (highly) significant in almost all equations. As commonly assumed, a larger share of own local revenues on total local revenues reduces municipal spending, revenue, deficits and debt. Political controls provide some noteworthy insights: While previous evidence suggests that expenditure and debt increase if more parties are involved in the executive (e.g., Feld et al., 2010; Volkerink and de Haan, 2001 ), our coalition variable indicates an opposite effect -though p-values are far from indicating significance. The ideology variable that measures the share of left-wing parties in the municipal executive is significant at the 1% level in the deficit equation but does not have the expected sign.
VERTICAL EFFECTS ON DIFFERENT SPENDING CATEGORIES
Based on recent evidence that budget rules have a stronger impact on state finances when the underlying budget variable is defined more narrowly (e.g. Hou and Smith, 2010; Mahdavi and Westerlund, 2011) , we investigate whether the effect of fiscal rules is more pronounced if more narrowly defined expenditure categories are considered instead of total spending. Municipalities might react to a debt brake induced spending change in a certain area by reallocating their spending among different categories, leaving total spending largely unaffected. To investigate this possibility we examine nine spending categories during the years 1990-2011 (sample 1) and 1982-2007 (sample 2).
Similar to the previous estimates, the results suggest that budget rules reduce local spending at least in some categories (Table A.3 and A.4) . However, in most spending areas the estimated signs of the debt brake coefficients contradict each other in the two datasets. This might be due to deviations in the definition of each spending area between the two samples. A similar effect in both samples obtains with respect to spending on education (negative) and other areas (positive). While the coefficients are not statistically significant in almost all cases, transportation spending is significantly depressed by both debt brake variables in the first sample. In the second sample, a significant negative effect obtains once we base our statistical inference on default standard errors (Table A.4 in braces) rather than the more reliable bootstrapped p-values (in square brackets). In sum, we find little evidence that cantonal debt brakes influence local expenditure neither in its entirety nor in specific spending areas. If anything, evidence suggests that local expenditure would decrease.
VERTICAL EFFECTS ON FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
While related studies reveal that cantonal debt brakes support fiscal discipline at the cantonal level (e.g., Kirchgässner, 2008, 2001a; Krogstrup and Wälti, 2008; Luechinger and Schaltegger, 2013; Schaltegger, 2002) , our baseline findings provide little evidence that cantonal debt brakes affect average finances at the local level. This raises the related question of whether cantonal budget rules affect fiscal decentralization. Given the large autonomy of Swiss municipalities on the expenditure and revenue sides, we employ two measures of fiscal decentralization to investigate this question: spending (revenue) decentralization is measured by the ratio of local spending (revenue) in a canton to local and cantonal spending (revenue) in that canton, i.e. (Local / [Cantonal + Local]). 16 Table 5 presents similar findings for both decentralization indicators. In line with our hypothesis (2), the results suggest that cantonal debt brakes reduce fiscal decentralization, i.e., lead to a higher level of cantonal as compared to local spending or revenue. While the fiscal rule index turns out to be insignificant, the debt brake dummy reaches statistical significance at the 10% level in the expenditure decentralization equation (1) and at the 5% level if revenue decentralization (3) is considered. The more conservative p-values based on the wild-cluster bootstrap-t procedure confirm statistical significance, though only at the 10% level (Table 5 in square brackets). Thus, we find little evidence for an impact of cantonal debt brakes on fiscal decentralization. If anything, our results suggest that debt brakes are associated with fiscal centralization. 3.10** 1.81 Note: Canton and year fixed effects are included. Constant not shown. The numbers in parentheses indicate the estimated t-statistics for standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the cantonal level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. These values are used to determine statistical significance: *p<0.1 (significance at the 10% level), **p<0.05 (significance at the 5% level), and ***p<0.01 (significance at the 1% level). The numbers in square brackets indicate the estimated p-values for the fiscal rule variables using the wild-cluster bootstrap-t procedure. The Wald test has the null hypothesis that the fixed effects are jointly equal to zero. The Chow test has the null hypothesis that the parameters of municipalities located in cantons with a debt brake are equal to those of the other group. For Wald and Chow tests, we report test statistics based on regressions with cluster-robust standard errors. This matches the above findings, i.e., the numerator -be it local expenditures or local revenues -is at least not increased by cantonal fiscal rules, and it matches recent evidence that cantonal expenditures and revenues, i.e., part of the denominator, are increased by cantonal fiscal rules .
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Given our baseline "non-findings" it seems crucial to carefully check whether vertical effects fail to be revealed due to methodological issues or whether they do not actually exist. With that goal in mind, we apply a wide range of robustness tests. In the interest of clarity, we only report results regarding the first sample and the debt brake dummy and base our statistical inference exclusively on the more conservative wild-cluster bootstrapped p-values. However, similar findings obtain if we consider the second sample, the fiscal rule index and cluster-robust standard errors (results upon request). A se o d approach mitigates these shortcomings by constructing a distinct measure for fiscal shocks and taking a much longer period into account . To be precise, we draw on, e.g., Lundberg (1997) , Poterba (1994) , Rueben (2001, 1999) , Rattsø (2004) and Rattsø and Tovmo (2002) and define a fiscal shock in canton c in year t as: A positive fiscal shock indicates an unfavorable deficit shock, i.e., an unexpected shortfall of current revenue or an unexpected increase in current spending. Conversely, a fiscal shock takes a negative value in case of an unexpected favorable surplus shock. 17 Since cantons frequently generate surpluses, it is not surprising that the mean of fiscal shocks is -0.158 (corresponding to a surplus shock) and that 558 surplus shocks and only 242 deficit shocks have been recorded.
Similar to cantonal budget deficits, deficit shocks cluster particularly during the 1990s (Figure   4 , left). However, during the period 1990-1998, the five fiscally constrained cantons experienced only ten deficit shocks taken all together and each Fribourg, Grisons and St. Gall faced only one (Figure 4, right) . This creates further doubt about the robustness of the above analysis of the period 1990-1998. In the second approach we interact the fiscal rule dummy with the newly constructed indicator for fiscal shocks, trying to clarify how changes in local finances and decentralization after a cantonal fiscal shock differ depending on the presence of a cantonal debt brake.
17 Note that a canton might face a shock although its books are balanced. This could be the case if a canton expects a budget surplus (deficit) and faces a deficit (surplus) shock. Furthermore, the definition of a fiscal shock implicitly assumes that the fiscal year's budget forecasts are not (strategically) biased. We are grateful to Luechinger and Schaltegger (2013) for providing us with data on expected and actual current income and expenses for the years 1984-1998. From 1999 onwards, the data source is the Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Finance. Table 6 briefly summarizes the findings. Both approaches broadly confirm our baseline estimates. Interestingly, debt brakes significantly improve municipal finances and reduce decentralization once we restrict the analysis to the sub-period 1990-1998 (Table 6, upper panel) . While these findings have to be taken with a great deal of caution, the second approach reveals somewhat similar effects as it suggests that debt brakes mitigate shock-related local deficits (Table 6 , lower panel). Regarding dependent variables other than budget deficits, neither the interaction term nor its constitutive terms are statistically significant. 18 We thus conclude that even in times of fiscal stress at the cantonal level, debt brakes do not lead to a burdening of local finances. If anything, the results indicate that debt brakes are associated with improved average municipal finances. Note: Besides the variables shown, we employ all controls as in the corresponding baseline regression of sample 1 (Table 3 and 5). Due to data limitations, public debt is only analyzed during the years 1990-2009. The numbers in square brackets indicate the estimated p-values using the wild-cluster bootstrap-t procedure. These values are used to determine statistical significance: *p<0.1 (significance at the 10% level), **p<0.05 (significance at the 5% level), and ***p<0.01 (significance at the 1% level). Full regression bodies available upon request.
Part II: General modifications
In the second part, we investigate the robustness of the baseline results by taking into account breaks in the time series, additional institutional controls, voter preferences, statistical outliers and the role of fixed effects.
Fi st, we examine several sub-periods in order to address structural breaks in the time series due to revised reporting standards, and to check whether the effect of cantonal debt brakes varies between "early" and "late" adopters. However, fixed effects and a low 18 The interpretation of the interaction terms is based on marginal effects as suggested by Brambor et al. (2006) . Thi d, to address the influence of voter preferences we exploit the information on voters' fiscal preferences revealed through the nationwide referendum on the federal debt brake in 2001 to divide the sample into two sub-panels: one panel with fiscally conservative voters (municipalities with approval rates above average) and one panel with voters that revealed low preferences for fiscal consolidation (municipalities with approval rates below average). If the estimated vertical effect in the two sub-panels is similar, the impact seems independent from voters' preferences.
Fou th, the influence of outliers is examined. The presence of outliers might lead to erroneous estimates of the standard errors as OLS weighs larger residuals more heavily and assumes normally distributed error terms. Due to federal asymmetries and interjurisdictional differences in areas such as geography, urbanization, industrialization and population size, the issue of outliers is likely to be of relevance in our case. While this problem is already mitigated by our large sample and the log transformation, we further address the issue by estimating a median regression and by discarding observations with a large Cook's distance.
19 19 The median regression estimates the 0.5 quantile of the dependent variable rather than the mean in ordinary regression. This minimizes the sum of the absolute residuals. Median regression is, thus, more robust to outliers in observations and the results are valid even if the errors are not independent and identically distributed. The Cook's distance is the accumulated change in the estimated coefficients if a particular observation is excluded. We follow a rule of thumb and discard observations with a Cook's distance greater than 4/N (where N is the number of observations in the sample).
Fifth, we test the robustness of baseline estimates to the exclusion of fixed effects as these might hide the impact of an institutional variable and render it insignificant. However, the debt brake dummy varies widely across time and cantons (Figure 1 ), making the exclusion of fixed effects problematic. On the one hand, the issue of omitted variables arises; on the other hand, cantonal asymmetries are not adequately taken into account. Moreover, fixed effects seem necessary to mitigate the impact of block concentrated outliers and to control for the voters' preferences. This is supported by the Wald tests as they suggest including two-way fixed effects (see baseline regressions).
The results are briefly summarized in Table A .8. In short, the robustness tests produce some variation in the results, while the baseline findings still seem robust to most specifications. In fact, almost all robustness checks confirm a negative though statistically insignificant impact of cantonal fiscal rules on local spending, revenue, deficit and fiscal decentralization. The sign of the debt brake dummy changes frequently in the debt equations but statistical significance hardly obtains. Interestingly enough, the effect of cantonal budget rules on spending and revenue decentralization becomes (highly) significant once outliers weigh less heavily through the application of median regressions or if we additionally control for the extent of cantonal direct democracy. Since direct democratic institutions are key elements of the fiscal framework in Switzerland, this is a highly important piece of evidence.
The results for jurisdictions with fiscally conservative and non-conservative voters are close to the baseline results. Yet, in fiscally non-conservative jurisdictions, cantonal budget rules have a significantly negative effect on local deficits (5% level) and on debt (10% level). This suggests that debt brakes spill over from the cantonal to the municipal level if local voters exercise little consolidation pressure. It should, however, be noted that the validity of this specification is restricted as the regression covers only eight fiscally non-conservative cantons, none of which had a debt brake in place before 2005. Finally, the exclusion of fixed effects -that should be taken with a great deal of caution -hardly reveals any further insights as debt brake coefficient remains insignificant in almost all equations.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Most empirical studies on fiscal rules focus on effects within the constrained entity such as the rules' impact on intra-jurisdictional finances, fiscal sustainability, macroeconomic stabilization and creative accounting. However, there are good reasons to assume that fiscal rules also have vertical effects on the finances of other levels of government even though those other levels are actually not covered by the rule. While municipal governments have contended that fiscal rules at a higher level of government were burdening their finances, opposite effects could also be justified. Thus, whether and how fiscal rules constraining fiscal deficits at an upper level of government affect finances at a lower level of governments is a question to be answered empirically.
In order to do so, this paper investigates the vertical effects of Swiss cantonal debt brakes on municipal expenditure, revenue, debt, deficits and fiscal decentralization. As the cantonal fiscal rules vary substantially across time and cantons, a Difference-in-Differences design can be used. We exploit a sample of cantonal aggregated data of all municipalities and a sample of disaggregated data of the 139 largest cities . This paper adds to both the existing literature on fiscal rules and to research on vertical effects of institutions. While previous studies suggest that debt brakes are strong enough to trigger fiscal consequences at the cantonal level (e.g., Krogstrup and Wälti, 2008) , we find little evidence that Swiss cantonal debt brakes affect average local finances or decentralization. This holds even in situations that make vertical effects most likely,
i.e., in times of fiscal shocks at the cantonal level. If anything, evidence suggests that cantonal debt brakes cushion the impact of fiscal shocks on local finances.
Our "non-findings" raise the question whether vertical effects are masked by methodological issues or do simply not exist. Therefore it is important to emphasize that we apply a wide range of robustness checks that largely confirm our "non-findings". However, as we estimate the average treatment effect, we cannot dismiss the possibility that municipalities respond in heterogeneous ways that compensate each other. Nevertheless, we suppose that municipalities react in similar ways since we do not find considerably different results if we take only a selection of municipalities into account. In fact, the findings are similar for both datasets and for the sub-samples of fiscally conservative and non-conservative municipalities. Still, vertical effects might be masked if municipalities respond in a way that compensates the initial effect. For instance, municipalities might react to a debt brake-induced spending change in a certain area by reallocating their spending among different categories with the result that total spending is largely unaffected. However, we dismiss this possibility as we do not find vertical effects of cantonal debt brakes in any spending category. Finally, vertical effects could be offset by transmission channels that work in opposite directions. Again, we cast doubt on this possibility as the domination of transmission channels that improve local finances seems most likely given the Swiss institutional framework (see Section 3). In line with this, our findings suggest that cantonal debt brakes are, if anything, associated with improved local finances.
While our findings are broadly in line with cursory evidence for Switzerland provided by and , earlier studies for the US suggest that fiscal rules in US states burden local finances (e.g., Kiewiet and Szakaly, 1996; von Hagen 1992) . We take this as a sign that our results are, at least party, due to a well-designed and incentive-based fiscal framework in Switzerland. Yet, much research remains to be done on the exact vertical transmission mechanisms in different institutional settings. 
APPENDIX
For reasons of clarity statistics for the nine spending categories are not shown. 
For reasons of clarity statistics for the nine spending categories are not shown. Note: # indicates that the variable is employed in both samples. The corresponding descriptive statistics for sample 2 might differ due to deviating time period. 1) Municipalities are recorded in the debt brake group only from the moment on in which the corresponding canton implements a debt brake. 2) Two-tailed p-value for the difference in means between the two groups of municipalities. The null hypothesis being that the difference between the means is zero. Note: * All monetary variables are deflated to the year 2000, based on the Swiss consumer price index. # indicates that variable is employed in both samples.
(1) Taxable income of natural persons, including special cases (e.g. in-between and temporary assessment, flat tax, residents with overseas income and foreigner with domestic income). Until 1998, cantonal taxes were collected on basis of the average income of the previous two years (praenumerando). Therefore, income data do not change for two consecutive years. In 1999 some, and two years later all, cantons moved towards a system of postnumerando taxation, i.e. tax collection according to same year's income, providing us with annual income data. Due to the transition from praenumerando to postnumerando taxation, income data is missing for two consecutive years in most cases. Missing income data was derived through interpolation. Data for 2011 was calculated by extrapolation. Table 4 ). The numbers in square brackets indicate the estimated p-values using wild-cluster bootstrap-t procedure. These values are used to determine statistical significance: *p<0.1 (significance at the 10% level), **p<0.05 (significance at the 5% level), and ***p<0.01 (significance at the 1% level). Numbers in braces indicate estimated t-statistics for default standard errors. The Wald test has the null hypothesis that the fixed effects are jointly equal to zero. For the Wald tests, we report test statistics based on regressions with default standard errors.
Control group (cantons without a debt brake) SO (1986) GR ( The number in braces indicate the estimated t-statistics for default standard errors. These values are used to determine statistical significance: *p<0.1 {significance at the 10% level}, **p<0.05 {significance at the 5% level}, and ***p<0.01 {significance at the 1% level}. The numbers in parentheses indicate the estimated t-statistics for standard errors adjusted for clustering at the cantonal level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. Table A.7 Reduced from regression of sample 2: Local finances of 139 large municipalities, 1982-2007 Note: "Confirm" means that the debt brake dummy keeps the same sign as in the baseline regression (i.e. negative) and that it does not reach statistical significance at any conventional level based on p-values calculated by the wild-cluster bootstrap-t-procedure. If the variable has a different sign than in our baseline estimation it is indicated by +/-. If the variables reach statistical significance it is indicated by: *(p<0.1), **(p<0.05) and ***(p<0.01). OLS regression including two-way fixed effects and all controls as employed in the baseline regression (Table 3 and 5). Full regression bodies available upon request. 1) Inference based on cluster-robust standard errors. 2) Deviating periods since debt data is only available between 1990 and 2009.
